

Message Text

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QUOTE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, UR, UNGA

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON SOVIET TEST BAN INITIATIVE

REFERENCES: MOSCOW 12947, MOSCOW 12888, USUN 4269,
USUN 4187, BELGRADE 4901

BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF
THE SOVIET TEST BAN INITIATIVE, A DISCUSSION OF THE RELE-
VANT BACKGROUND AND LIKELY REACTIONS BY OTHER STATES AT THE
UNGA, AND GUIDANCE FOR DEALING WITH THE INITIATIVE. IT MAY
BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FURTHER TACTICS AS THE TEST BAN
ISSUE DEVELOPS AT UNGA. END SUMMARY.

1. INTRODUCTION. IN A LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 11, 1975,
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FROM FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL,
THE USSR PROPOSED THE INCLUSION IN THE 30TH UNGA AGENDA.
"AS AN IMPORTANT AND URGENT QUESTION," OF AN ITEM ENTITLED
"CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHI-

BITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS," AND ASSERTED THAT "THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY OUTLAWING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS WOULD BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO LIMITING THE ARMS RACE." ANNEXED TO THE LETTER WAS A "DRAFT TREATY ON THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS." THE LETTER ITSELF, HOWEVER, MAKES NO REFERENCE TO

THE ATTACHED DRAFT TREATY, NOR DOES IT SUGGEST WHAT TYPE OF UNGA ACTION, SUCH AS ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION, THE USSR MIGHT WISH TO PROMOTE. THE USG WAS OFFICIALLY INFORMED OF THE IMPENDING ACTION BY A NOTE FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY ON SEPTEMBER 9, WHICH EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE USG WOULD SUPPORT THE INITIATIVE "AND WOULD FACILITATE THE ADOPTION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF A RESOLUTION AIMED AT THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL BANNING OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS."

2. NATURE OF THE SOVIET TREATY PROPOSAL. THE DRAFT TREATY CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS:

A. SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION. ARTICLE I OF THE DRAFT TREATY WOULD PROHIBIT ANY TEST EXPLOSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, OUTER SPACE, UNDER WATER, AND UNDER GROUND. IT IS NOT CLEAR, IN THIS CONNECTION, WHETHER THE SOVIETS INTEND THAT THE TREATY WOULD REPLACE THE LTBT. IN THE PREAMBLE, (S#3 9;835 ,953 5#3 8.094- TANCE OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE LTBT "UP TO THE TIME OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE" OF THE DRAFT CTB TREATY, SUGGESTING THAT THE LTBT MAY AT THAT POINT CEASE TO HAVE FORCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, ARTICLE IV OF THE DRAFT STATES THAT THE CTB TREATY "SHALL NOT AFFECT OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY UNDER OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS." IF THE SOVIETS DO INDEED INTEND THAT THE NEW TREATY WOULD TAKE THE PLACE OF THE LTBT, THIS COULD INDICATE A SOVIET INTEREST, STEMMING FROM AN INTEREST IN PNE EXCAVATION, IN ELIMINATING THE LTBT PROHIBITION AGAINST EXPLOSIONS CAUSING RADIOACTIVE
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DEBRIS TO CROSS THE NATIONAL BORDERS OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE EXPLOSION TAKES PLACE.

B. PARTICIPATION. ARTICLE VI SPECIFIES THAT THE TREATY WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE ONLY WHEN AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF STATES, INCLUDING ALL THE "NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES," HAVE RATIFIED. THE STATUS THAT INDIA WOULD HAVE UNDER THE TREATY IS NOT MADE EXPLICIT ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS POINT OUT IN THE EMBASSY'S NOTE TO THE DEPARTMENT THAT "A TREATY WOULD BE MEANINGFUL ONLY IF ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS BECOME PARTIES TO IT." (THIS WOULD NOT INCLUDE INDIA AS A NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE.)

C. VERIFICATION AND COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES. ARTICLE II PROVIDES FOR VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. IT ALSO PROVIDES FOR SUBMISSION OF COMPLAINTS OF SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

D. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNES). ARTICLE III SPECIFIES THAT PNES WILL BE GOVERNED BY A SPECIAL AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, WHICH WILL BE CONCLUDED "AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE." ALTHOUGH A PRE-AMBULAR PARAGRAPH SEEMS TO INDICATE A SOVIET INTENTION TO PRECLUDE THE CARRYING OUT OF PNES BY A "NNWS" (E.G. INDIA), THE LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE III AS DRAFTED WOULD NOT APPEAR TO HAVE THAT EFFECT. THIS APPARENT DISCREPANCY MAY SIMPLY BE A DRAFTING PROBLEM.

3. BACKGROUND. THIS IS THE FIRST "COMPREHENSIVE" TEST BAN TREATY DRAFT THE SOVIETS HAVE PUT FORWARD SINCE NOVEMBER 28, 1961, DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE LTBT, ALTHOUGH ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS CALLED FOR THE CONCLUSION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE REQUIREMENT FOR VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WITH NO PROVISION FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS (A LONG-STANDING U.S. REQUIREMENT), IS A TRADITIONAL ELEMENT OF THEIR POSITION. (IN THE TTBT CONTEXT THE SOVIETS INSISTED THAT THE 150 KT LIMIT ON WEAPONS TESTS AT DESIGNATED TEST SITES BE MONITORED BY NTM (SUPPLEMENTED BY DATA EXCHANGE), ALTHOUGH THEY ARE PREPARED IN CONFIDENTIAL

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SOME CASES TO PERMIT ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF PNES OUTSIDE OF WEAPONS TESTING SITES. THUS, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN VERIFICATION OF WEAPONS TESTING CONSTRAINTS AND PNES. FOR THE USSR, THE LACK OF PROVISION FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION IN ARTICLE II WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH A PROVISION FOR ON-SITE OBSERVA-

TION IN A SEPARATE AGREEMENT.) THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO STATED MANY TIMES THAT THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF A CTB. TWO NEWER ELEMENTS IN THEIR TEST BAN POSITION HAVE NOW BEEN MADE EXPLICIT. THESE ARE (A) THE REQUIREMENT THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES MUST PARTICIPATE IN THE TEST BAN, AND (B) THE TREATMENT OF PNES IN A SEPARATE AGREEMENT, IN AN ANALOGOUS MANNER TO THE TTBT/PNE SITUATION.

4. THE CTB INITIATIVE, WHICH IS THE MOST RECENT OF A SERIES OF MAJOR SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS AT THE UNGA, MAY REFLECT SEVERAL SOVIET MOTIVATIONS:

A. THE INITIATIVE REINFORCES THE CURRENT SOVIET LINE THAT "POLITICAL DETENTE" SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY

"MILITARY DETENTE";

B. IN LIGHT OF CRITICISM OF THE TTBT AND CONTINUING PRESSURE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE BAN, PARTICULARLY AT THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, THE INITIATIVE ALLOWS THE SOVIETS TO DEMONSTRATE TO CTB PROPONENTS THAT THEY ARE NOT

CONTENT TO SETTLE FOR PARTIAL TESTING RESTRAINTS AND THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION;

C. IT MAY BE DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA POSITION AS A CHAMPION OF DISARMAMENT;

D. IT APPARENTLY ATTEMPTS TO SHIFT THE BLAME TO THE OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES (MOST POINTEDLY TO THE CHINESE, AND ALSO TO THE FRENCH) FOR LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD A CTB;

E. IT MAY REFLECT A SOVIET DESIRE TO STAKE OUT FIRM POSITIONS ON THE QUESTIONS OF PARTICIPATION AND PNEs, CONFIDENTIAL

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EVEN AT SOME RISK OF DRAWING CRITICISM. THEY MAY REGARD THIS AS NECESSARY TO COUNTER INCREASING PRESSURES FOR A THREE-POWER AGREEMENT THAT WOULD BAN ALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR THESE STATES.

F. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET INITIATIVE REFLECTS ANY DESIRE TO SCUTTLE THE TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS OR TO PREVENT THE TTBT'S ENTRY INTO FORCE. PRESUMABLY, THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR PROPOSAL WILL NOT LEAD

TO TREATY NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

5. THE U.S. POSITION ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED, BY THE LTBT, THE NPT, THE TTBT, AND BY NUMEROUS POLICY STATEMENTS, TO THE OBJECTIVE OF A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTS IF ADEQUATELY VERIFIED. THE U.S. POSITION REGARDING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IS THAT WHILE THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN SEISMIC MONITORING CAPABILITIES, ADEQUATE VERIFICATION STILL REQUIRES SOME ON-SITE INSPECTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUSPICIOUS EVENTS ARE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

6. A RELATED ELEMENT REGARDING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IS THE TREATMENT OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES (PNEs) UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE WEAPONS TEST BAN. THE U.S. HAS STATED THAT IF PNEs WERE TO BE ACCOMMODATED UNDER A CTB, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEVISE A VERIFICATION SYSTEM THAT WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE NOT ONLY THAT CLANDESTINE WEAPONS TESTS WERE NOT GOING UNDETECTED AND UNIDENTIFIED, BUT ALSO THAT WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS WERE NOT BEING ACQUIRED FROM

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS CARRIED OUT OPENLY AND OSTENSIBLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. TO ACHIEVE THE LATTER OBJECTIVE, A CONTROL SYSTEM, AT A MINIMUM, WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT PNES DID NOT INVOLVE THE TESTING OF A NEW WEAPON CONCEPT, THE SUBSTITUTION OF A STOCKPILED

WEAPON FOR THE "PNE" EXPLOSIVE TO VERIFY ITS PERFORMANCE, OR THE CARRYING OUT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS STUDIES. NO SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN FOUND.
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7. AN AGREEMENT THAT GIVES ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT PNES ARE NOT BEING USED TO ACHIEVE WEAPONS-RELATED BENEFITS OTHERWISE UNAVAILABLE APPEARS TO BE POSSIBLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 150 KT TTBT. HOWEVER, UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING, THE OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING THE ACQUISITION OF WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS FROM A PNE PROGRAM WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO AUTHORIZED WEAPONS TESTING UNDER A CTB, INCENTIVES FOR SEEKING MILITARY BENEFITS IN THE COURSE OF A PNE PROGRAM WOULD BE MUCH GREATER THAN UNDER A THRESHOLD TEST BAN REGIME THAT PERMITTED PNES.

8. THE U.S. HAS TAKEN THE PUBLIC POSITION THAT IT HAS NOT MADE A DETERMINATION THAT A CTB WOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO ENTER INTO FORCE.

9. LIKELY REACTIONS AT UNGA. REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET INITIATIVE ARE LIKELY TO BE MIXED, WITH ONLY THE USSR'S ALLIES GIVING UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT. MOST NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS AND A FEW U.S. ALLIES WILL PROBABLY WELCOME THE FACT THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE CONCLUSION OF THE LBT ONE OF THE SUPERPOWERS HAS MADE A FORMAL CTB PROPOSAL AND THAT THE ANNUAL SOVIET DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE THIS YEAR DEALS WITH A SUBJECT THAT IS WIDELY CONSIDERED TO DESERVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY IN MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT WORK.

10. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY OF THESE DELEGATIONS CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE SKEPTICAL ABOUT SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND TO CRITICIZE ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. IN PARTICULAR, ADVOCATES OF AN EARLY CTB WILL OBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE AGREEMENT CAN ONLY ENTER INTO FORCE WHEN ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES HAVE ADHERED. A NUMBER OF STATES, INCLUDING CANADA, NETHERLANDS, JAPAN, AND SWEDEN, MAY TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT'S TREATMENT OF PNES (I.E., SIMPLY DEFERRING THE ISSUE FOR SOLUTION IN A

SEPARATE AGREEMENT) PROVIDES LITTLE ASSURANCE THAT THE
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QUESTION OF PNE VERIFICATION WILL BE ADEQUATELY HANDLED.
THE CHINESE AND FRENCH WILL MOST LIKELY INTERPRET THE
SOVIET PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENT AS AN EFFORT TO SHIFT
THE BLAME TO THEM FOR LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROGRESS TOWARD
A CTB.

11. U.S. TACTICS. TWO PRINCIPAL FACTORS ARGUE FOR A
RELATIVELY
LOW-KEY U.S. APPROACH TO THE SOVIET TEST BAN
INITIATIVE: (A) IN LIGHT OF THE CRITICISM THAT
THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO RECEIVE FROM MANY QUARTERS,
THE U.S. IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ISOLATED IN OPPOSITION OR
PUT ON THE SPOT TO PRESENT DETAILED REACTIONS OR A
COUNTERPROPOSAL AND CAN, THEREFORE, AVOID TAKING AN
UNNECESSARILY HIGH PROFILE ON THE ISSUE; (B) SINCE THE
U.S. IS UNWILLING TO OFFER A COUNTERPROPOSAL, ACTIVE
OPPOSITION TO THE INADEQUATE ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET
INITIATIVE WOULD LEAVE THE U.S. VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM
FROM CTB PROPONENTS.

12. IN ACCORDANCE WITH LOW-KEY APPROACH, MISSION SHOULD:

A. KEEP USG REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET INITIATIVE TO A
MINIMUM (PERHAPS LIMITED TO REFERENCES IN THE FIRST
COMMITTEE OPENING STATEMENT AND THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE
ON CTB RESOLUTIONS);

B. PROVIDE U.S. VIEWS ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WHEN THE
SUBJECT IS RAISED BY OTHERS, RATHER THAN TAKING THE
INITIATIVE TO COMMENT ON IT;

C. TREAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN A RESPECTFUL
MANNER, POINTING OUT THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW MADE A
CONCRETE CTB PROPOSAL FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE LTBT,
THE DRAFT TREATY IS GENERALLY BASED ON LONG-ESTABLISHED
ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET TEST BAN POSITION;

D. IN CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES, DRAW AS APPROPRIATE
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ON ELEMENTS OUTLINED IN PARA FOUR ABOVE IN CHARACTER-
IZING U.S. VIEWS ON SOVIET INITIATIVE;

E. REAFFIRM, WHEN APPROPRIATE, U.S. COMMITMENT TO AN
ADEQUATELY-VERIFIED CTB;

F. MAINTAIN THAT, WHILE THE U.S. SHARES THE SOVIET DRAFT'S OBJECTIVE OF PUTTING AN END TO ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS BY EVERYONE, IT HAS RESERVAIONS ABOUT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE APPROACH ADOPTED IN THE DRAFT (E.G., THE DRAFT LACKS PROVISION FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION AND LEAVES UNRESOLVED WHETHER AN ADEQUATELY-VERIFIABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR PNES CAN BE WORKED OUT);

G. EXPRESS DOUBT, IF QUERIED ON THE PARTICIPATION ISSUE, THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS NGOTIABLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN LIGHT OF ITS PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENT AND THE CONFLICTING VIEWS ON TEST BAN ISSUES OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES;

H. REITERATE AS NECESSARY U.S. POSITIONS (PARAS 5-8, ABOVE) ON VERIFICATION, PNES, AND PARTICIPATION.

I. POINT OUT THAT PROGRESS TOWARD A CTB CAN ONLY BE MADE AS CERTAIN PROBLEMS (E.G., DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF LOW-YIELD SEISMIC EVENTS, PNE VERIFICATION) ARE RESOLVED, AND THAT PROPOSALS THAT IGNORE OR MINIMIZE THESE REAL OBSTACLES ARE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO CONCRETE STEPS FORWARD. THE U.S. WOULD HOPE THESE ISSUES WOULD BE EXAMINED AT THE MARCH 1976 TEST BAN EXPERTS MEETING AT THE CCD;

J. INDICATE THAT THE U.S. HOPES THAT THE TTBT, AND ESPECIALLY ITS INNOVATIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, WILL CREATE A SOUND TECHNICAL BASIS FOR FURTHER TEST BAN RESTRAINTS AND THAT IT WILL FACILITATE PROGRESS TOWARD A CTB.

13. INFO ADDRESSES MAY DRAW ON ABOVE GUIDANCE IN RESPONDING TO QUERIES. INGERSOLL UNQUOTE KISSINGER
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